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PRIVACY AND THE PRESS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: HOW
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ARE DRIVING THE PRIVACY
DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD
Jane E. Kirtley"
In 1890, an American attorney named Louis D. Brandeis was fed
up with what he saw as the excesses of the popular press in Boston,
Massachusetts. Gossip columns regaled the hoipolloi with insolent and
insinuating details about the doings of their socially-prominent betters,
including the wife of Brandeis's law partner, Samuel D. Warren. The
stories were truthful-if snide-so suing for libel was not an option.
Instead, Warren and Brandeis did what any enterprising and
outraged lawyer would do. They wrote a scholarly article, which they
published in the HarvardLaw Review.' They advanced the following:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle
and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with
industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details
of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily
papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with
idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the
domestic circle?
Brandeis and Warren further asserted that not only were these stories
embarrassing to their news subjects, but the stories degraded the readers
as well.
Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of
more, and, in direct proportion to its circulation, results in a lowering
of social standards and of morality. Even gossip apparently harmless,
when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil.... When
personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space
available for matters of real interest to the community, what wonder
that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance?
* Silha Professor of Media Ethics and Law, School of Journalism and Mass
Communication, University of Minnesota.
1. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REv. 193 (1890).
2. Id. at 196.
3. Id.
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The law partners concluded that the ideal solution would be to create a
new legal theory, a "right to be let alone," to be recognized at common
law.4
Of course, Brandeis and Warren were not the first to conclude that
the gutter press was going too far, with their new-fangled "mechanical
devices" that could record conversations and cameras that produced
"instantaneous" pictures. As they recognized, lawsuits in England had
already prevented the exhibition and distribution of copies of photo-
graphic portraits without the subject's consent.'
Nor did the law partners invent the concept of "privacy." They
acknowledged that France already had recognized the right to "la vie
privee" in its 1868 press law.6 Nevertheless, Warren and Brandeis
decided to create a distinctly American remedy for this most offensive
practice, sounding in tort "in all cases," with the option of recovering
monetary damages, and in equity, in the form of an injunction, "in
perhaps a very limited class of cases."7 Courts in the United States
initially were reluctant to embrace this new legal theory. The New York
Court of Appeals refused, in a 4-3 decision, to recognize a common law
remedy for the unauthorized use of a young woman's image in an
advertisement in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.8 Congress did
nothing to enact laws to codify the privacy rights proposed by Warren
and Brandeis, and, for the most part, state legislative action was limited
to statutes that would protect an individual's right to safeguard his name
and image from commercial exploitation.
Yet with one law review article, this pair of Boston lawyers lit the
slow fuse on a time bomb that took about 100 years to explode. When
it did, the impact was felt around the world.
A variety of international human rights declarations and conven-
tions created after the Second World War recognized that
privacy-traditionally defined as a person's family life, home, and
correspondence-is a fundamental right.9 Preservation of personal
4. See id. at 195 n.4. Although scholars often credit this phrase to Warren and
Brandeis, apparently Judge Thomas Cooley first coined it. See id. 195 at n.4.
5. See id. at 202.
6. See id. at 214 n. 1.
7. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 219.
8. 64 N.E. 442, 447-48 (N.Y. 1902).
9. See, e.g., Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8(1) (visited July 6, 2000) <http://www.
coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/5e.htm>; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for




privacy, often subjectively defined, was perceived as essential to
functioning within a democratic society, justifying the enactment of
comprehensive privacy legislation regulating all sectors of society.'°
Meanwhile, in the United States, William Prosser had catalogued
four distinct forms of "invasion of privacy" in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts: physical intrusion into the individual's seclusion," public
disclosure of facts that are not deemed "newsworthy,"'2 portrayal of an
individual in a false light, 3 and misappropriation of a person's name or
likeness.'4 In the states, legislatures enacted statutes ranging from broad
declarations of general rights to privacy, to codifications of one or more
of the common law torts, to sectoral-specific regulation."
Inevitably, the rights of the news media to gather and report news,
and to inform the public, collided squarely with this "fundamental" right
of privacy. In the United States, at least, repeated skirmishes between
proponents of these seemingly irreconcilable interests were generally
resolved in favor of the press, at least if the publisher had lawfully
obtained truthful information which was arguably newsworthy. 6
By 1990, the conflict began to come to a head. Much of the debate
was driven by the same factors that had influenced Warren and
Brandeis-brash, sensationalistic media who trafficked in salacious
stories about the rich and powerful, and who utilized sophisticated
photographic and recording equipment to capture their subjects in
embarrassing and compromising situations. The British Parliament, for
example, launched fact-finding committees to examine the need for new
legislation to criminalize the use of surreptitious surveillance devices in
newsgathering,' 7 and a Press Complaints Commission ("PCC") was
created to allow citizens to air their grievances about press misconduct. 8
10. See Peter P. Swire & Robert E. Litan, Avoiding a Showdown Over EU Privacy
Laws Policy Brief #29-February 1998 (visited July 6, 2000) <http://www.
brook.edu/comm/PolicyBriefs/pb029/pb29.htm>.
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
12. See id. § 652D.
13. See id. § 652E.
14. See id. § 652C.
15. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier
for Individual Rights, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 210-19 (1992).
16. See FRED CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 70 (1997); see also Peter B.
Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L. REV.
1195, 1196-99 (1990).
17. See REPORTOFTHE COMMrrTEEON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS, 1 990, Cmnd.
1102, at 1, 64-65.
18. See Louis Blom-Cooper, Freedom and Responsibility, 3 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 2,
3 (1992); Brian MacArthur, Deadline Looms as Editors Press On with Reform, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Jan. 6, 1991, § 3 at 8 (quoting Louis Blom-Cooper).
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But it was not until 1997, following the death of Diana, Princess of
Wales, in a car crash in a Paris tunnel while she and her companions
were attempting to dodge a pack of paparazzi, that public support for
new restrictions on reporting about individuals really took hold. Using
Diana's death as a pretext, the European Parliament scheduled an
"emergency" debate on strengthening privacy laws, and its Culture and
Media Committee asked the European Commission to launch a
comparative study of existing legislation with the aim of developing an
international "code of conduct" for the news media. 9 The PCC declared
that British newspapers should stop buying paparazzi photographs
obtained "illegally or unethically."20
In the United States., flurries of bills were introduced in Congress
and in several states to invent a new crime of "harassment," to create
buffer zones around famous people, and to authorize official inquiries
into journalistic behavior." In the frenzy to curb media conduct and
coverage that some found distasteful, the state of Michigan adopted a
law that prohibits photographing corpses in open graves or at disaster
scenes, such as underwater shipwrecks, from which it would be difficult
to recover the body.22
Although much of the initial hysteria about intrusive news coverage
died down in relatively short order, more enduring privacy concerns
continued to fuel efforts to restrict both newsgathering and reporting.
Generally, this restriction took the form of trying to force the press to
act in accordance with someone's idea of "responsibility." Unfortu-
nately, in too many cases, "responsibility ' translates into quiescence and
self-censorship.
In 1999, the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission published its
proposal to establish a statutorily-created (but supposedly "independ-
ent") Press Council with the mandate of "protecting" citizens from the
excesses of the news media.23 Among other things, the Council would
draft a mandatory privacy code, hear complaints, and levy fines against
news organizations who violate the code.
19. See Leayla Linton, Diana's Death to Spur Media Curbs?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 22,
1997, at Al1.
20. Dan Balz, British Newspaper Editors Endorse Rules Curbing Harassment by Media,
WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1997, at A2 1.
21. See, e.g., H.R. 2448, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997); S. 1777, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1998); S. 1379, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998).
22. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.160a(1) (2000).
23. See LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF HONG KONG, SUB-COMMvTTEE ON PRIVACY,
CONSULTATION PAPER ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY (1999).
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At about the same time, alleged concerns about protecting the rights
of persons held in police custody prompted introduction of a French bill
to prohibit photographs of individuals wearing handcuffs.24 The same
bill also makes it a crime to publish images of crime scenes if doing so
would "compromise" the dignity of a victim.25 And a proposed press
law passed by the Senate in the Czech Republic later that year obliges
news organizations which accurately report truthful facts that "infringe
the privacy of a legal entity" to publish that legal entity's response.26
Laudable proposals these might be, at least to some eyes. After all,
who can oppose a statute purporting to uphold the sacred presumption
of innocence? Who can object to a law attempting to shield crime
victims from public ridicule? Who can disagree with a law demanding
that news organizations be "fair"? Who can be against privacy?
The problem with these proposals, as well as all the virtually
identical measures contemplated elsewhere, including in the United
States, is that they provide individuals, through the instrumentalities and
often with the complicity of the government, the power to control the
content of news reporting. News subjects are often selectively reclusive
and reluctant. They would far prefer to keep intact their preferred public
persona, rather than allow a persistent press to shatter a carefully-
cultivated illusion. These laws give them the license to do so.
This scenario is troubling enough when it serves the purposes of
celebrities and other public figures who merely capture the public's
curiosity and imagination. It is downright dangerous when it serves
public officials, who may have reasons of their own, only tangentially
related to legitimate privacy, to try to hide the truth from the public.
In addition to legislation designed to directly regulate the conduct
and editorial judgments ofjournalists, the dawn of the computer age has
heralded an eruption of efforts to restrict the collection, retention and
distribution of "personal" data, by news organizations as well as other
businesses, all in the name of protecting privacy.
24. See Project de Loi Renforcant la Protection de la Presomption d 'nnocence et les
Droits des Victimes, Presentation en Conseil des Ministres (1998) (Fr.); Charles
Trueheart, French Plan to Curb Candid Cameras Sparks Controversy, WASH. POST, Sept.
21, 1999, atA13. The French senate passed the bill on May 30, 2000. See Jon Henley,
French Media Fury at Privacy Laws, GUARDIAN, June 1, 2000, at 19.
25. See Project, supra note 24.
26. Government Bill Act on the Rights and Obligations in Publishing of Periodical Press
and on Amendment of Some Other Acts (1999) (Czech Rep.).
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The European Union's 1995 Data Protection Directive" is possibly
the most influential and far-reaching initiative to control the dissemina-
tion of news ever conceived. It allows "data subjects" unprecedented
rights to exercise dominion over information that uniquely identifies
them, including everything from government identification numbers to
physical, economic and cultural characteristics such as race, ethnicity,
religion, or political affiliation.28
Among other things, the Directive requires "processors" of data29
to notify individuals of how they will use information collected about
them,30 as well as give the subjects the right to approve or veto those
uses, gain access to databases containing the information, and demand
copies, corrections, or deletions"-most or all of which would be
irreconcilable with the practice ofjournalism as we have known it in the
United States.
It is true that the Directive includes an exemption of sorts for those
engaged in data collection for "journalistic purposes."32  But the
exemption is by no means absolute. It applies only to the extent
necessary to "reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing free
expression"-whatever those "rules" may be-and of course, only to
those who can prove that they are "journalists" entitled to invoke the
exemption.33 One German data commissioner has written that it is "self
evident that not everybody can declare himself to be ajournalist in order
to profit from exemptions from the general data protection legislation." '34
As the effective date of the Directive loomed, the Clinton adminis-
tration attempted to persuade the European Union to accept a
government-created "safe harbor" principle, allowing United States
companies to continue to self-regulate, "voluntarily," their collection,
storage, and use of personal data-an approach characterized by some
27. See EUR-OP, EUR-Lex Community Legislation in Force-Document 395L006
(visited July 5,2000) <http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1995/en_395L0046.
html>.
28. See id. art. 2(a).
29. See id. arts. 2(b), 2(d).
30. See id. art. 18.
31. Seeid. arts. 12, 15.
32. See id. art. 9.
33. EUR-OP, EUR-Lex Community Legislation in Force-Document 395L006 art. 9
(visited July 5,2000) <http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1 995/en_395L0046
.html>.
34. Stefan Walz, Relationship Between the Freedom of the Press and the Right to
Informational Privacy in the Emerging Information Society, 1, 5, in 19TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF PRIVACY DATA PROTECTION COMMIssIONERs, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (1997).
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European officials as "some kind of fox guarding the chicken coop."35
Nevertheless, by March 2000, it appeared that a rapprochement would
be reached. Under the Safe Harbor agreement, a company in the United
States would be permitted to choose one of four methods of complying
with the Directive: accepting the authority of an EU member state's
data protection agency; demonstrating that it is subject to federal
privacy laws considered comparable to the Directive; agreeing to be
monitored by an organization regulated by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion; or submitting to the jurisdiction of European regulators in any
privacy disputes.36
Despite the triumphant statements of United States Undersecretary
of Commerce David Aaron and European Commissioner Director
General John Mogg that a "breakthrough" had occurred," Europeans
continue to be skeptical that the American approach will satisfy their
privacy concerns.38 Perhaps they need not worry unduly, however.
Whether driven by the desire to conform with the Directive, or by
separate and discrete concerns about personal privacy, United States law
is rapidly moving toward European-style solutions to the privacy
"problem."
Consider, for example, two recent decisions of the Supreme Court:
Condon v. Reno39 and Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting
Publishing Corp.4° The opinions in both cases, authored by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, do not bode well for the news media's ability to
gain access to personal data contained in public records.
In Condon, the high court unanimously rejected a Tenth Amend-
ment challenge, brought by several states, to the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act ("DPPA").4' This statute requires all state agencies
responsible for maintaining drivers' and motor vehicle records to
35. Deborah Hargreaves, Progress in Talks Over Data Privacy, FiN. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2000, at 8.
36. See Dep't of Commerce, Draft International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles
(visited July 5,2000) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/redlinedprinciples3I600.htm>;
David L. Aaron, March 17, 2000 letter (visited July 5, 2000) <http://www.ita.doc.
gov/td/ecom/aaron317letter.htm>.
37. U.S.-EUJoint Press Briefing: Data Protection Discussions, Brussels, Belgium (Feb.
22, 2000).
38. As one journalist put it, "It's my impression that the discussion with the
American side is being surrealistic to some extent because the aim is to protect data,
but at the same time we know there are massive violations to our privacy by the
Americans ..... Id.
39. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
40. 120 S. Ct. 483 (1999).
41. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
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prohibit release to the general public unless record subjects affirmatively
"opt in" to the master database.42 Although certain public and private
actors such as courts, law enforcement officers, insurance companies,
tow truck operators, and commercial trucking employers would be
permitted continued access, journalists would not. 3 Several states
chafed at these strictures, in part because they represented a significant
federal incursion into public records policy, and in part because they
feared the loss of substantial revenue derived from the sale of motor
vehicle records to any and all requesters."
In defending the statute in these challenges, the federal government
argued that the DPPA would enforce a constitutional right of privacy
that "automobile owners and operators [reasonably expected in] their
names, addresses, and phone numbers."'45 This argument was rejected
by the Fourth Circuit, which noted that "there is no general right to
privacy" guaranteed by the Constitution, and that to the extent such a
right exists, it does not extend to the personal information in motor
vehicle records-information easily detectible in ordinary interactions.46
Before the Supreme Court, the federal government relied solely on
its second argument, that the DPPA was a legitimate exercise of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.47 The high court
agreed and distinguished rulings in earlier Tenth Amendment chal-
lenges. Rehnquist wrote that rather than "seek(ing] to control or
influence the manner in which States regulate private parties," DPPA
merely "regulate[d] state activities." 8 Although conceding that many
states might have to amend statutes or regulations, such changes were
simply "an inevitable consequence of regulating a state activity.""
In a startling pronouncement, the Supreme Court also rejected the
contention that the federal government was effectively commandeering
administrative functions that were solely within the authority of the
states. Congress has the power to regulate a state-owned public
database, just as it can regulate a database owned by a private entity."0
42. See Pub. L. No. 106-69, § 350, 113 Stat. 1025 (1999).
43. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721(b)(1), (4), (7), (9) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
44. See David Beatty, Protect Motorists' Privacy, USA TODAY, Apr. 14, 1994, at
1 OA; John Yacavone, Is Your State Prepared to Implement the Driver's Privacy Protection
Act, MOVE, Spring 1997, at 22.
45. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 464. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held
similarly in Pryorv. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, 1288 (1 Ith Cir. 1999).






To the Condon Court, personal information becomes a commodity
susceptible to federal regulation once it enters the stream of commerce.
States lose their unique status as sovereign owners and operators of
databases, susceptible to regulation by the federal government, just as
any other holder of similar information would be.
The Condon decision is also significant for what it does not address.
The opinion fails to include any discussion of the competing interests
of access and privacy, which presumably sparked the enactment of the
DPPA in the first place. But ominous language in the United Reporting
decision, handed down just a few weeks earlier, suggests that the
balance would not be struck in favor of access.5'
In that case, the high court rejected a publisher's First Amendment
challenge to a California statute that forbade individuals to obtain copies
of arrest records if the individuals intended to use the data for commer-
cial purposes. 2 Under an earlier version of the California open records
law, law enforcement agencies were required to "make public the full
name, current address, and occupation of every individual arrested...
"" United Reporting, a private publishing service, routinely obtained
names and addresses of persons recently arrested, then sold them to
attorneys, insurance companies, substance abuse clinics, and other
interested parties.'
After the 1996 amendment, persons requesting access to arrest
records were compelled to declare, under penalty of pejury, that they
sought the information for one of five enumerated purposes,55 and that
they would not use the information "directly or indirectly to sell a
product or service. 56 Although United Reporting contended that its
access to the records fell under the journalistic exemption, the statute
clearly precluded it from reselling the data to its customers." Accord-
ingly, the publisher sought injunctive relief, arguing that the statute was
unconstitutional because it restricted free speech.5
The Ninth Circuit held that the statute violated United Reporting's
First Amendment rights, even though it concluded that the publisher's
51. See United Reporting, 120 S. Ct. at 488.
52. See id. at 489 (citing CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6254(f)(3) (West Supp. 1999)).
53. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(f) (West 1995).
54. See United Reporting, 120 S. Ct. at 486.
55. The statute exempts investigative, "scholarly, journalistic, political, or
governmental" purposes. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(f)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
56. Id.
57. See United Reporting, 120 S. Ct. at 487.
58. See United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. California Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d
1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).
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speech was solely commercial. 9 "United Reporting sells arrestee
information to clients; nothing more. Its speech can be reduced to, 'I
[United Reporting] will sell you [client] the X [names and addresses of
arrestees] at the Y price,"' the court said.'
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
agreed that United Reporting was entitled to some First Amendment
protection.6' Utilizing the four-prong test articulated in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,62 the court found that
the statute failed to advance the state's admittedly substantial interest in
protecting the privacy of arrested individuals. Specifically, the court
observed that anyone who was allowed access to the data would be free
to publish the information in "any newspaper article or magazine in the
country so long as the information is not used for commercial pur-
poses." 3 By contrast, "[h]aving one's name, crime, and address printed
in the local paper is a far greater affront to privacy than receiving a letter
from an attorney, substance abuse counselor, or driving school eager to
help one overcome his present difficulties (for a fee, naturally).""
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the argument that the statute
infringed on United Reporting's First Amendment rights at all.63 Chief
Justice Rehnquist framed the issue as "nothing more than a governmen-
tal denial of access to information in its possession." California, as
owner and operator of the database, has authority to decide whether to
limit or extend access to information contained therein, the Court said,
adding that the state could even elect to withhold the information
entirely without offending the First Amendment.67
Several Justices appeared troubled by the prospect that the state
might arbitrarily grant favored status to requesters who claimed they
would use the material for enumerated, favored uses, as opposed to
other, disfavored uses. In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg
argued that a grant of access is the equivalent of a subsidy to certain
users, permissible only so long as "the award of the subsidy is not based
on an illegitimate criterion such as viewpoint."" She cautioned the
59. See id, at 1137.
60. Id. at 1137.
61. See id. at 1140.
62. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
63. United Reporting, 146 F.3d at 1140.
64. Id.
65. See United Reporting, 120 S. Ct. at 489.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 491 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Court to avoid presenting states with the Hobson's choice of either
keeping records open to all comers, or sealing them completely. 9
Justice Scalia, whose concurrence was joined by Justice Thomas,
chided the Court for failing to address the question of whether the
California statute created "a restriction upon access that allows access
to the press (which in effect makes the information part of the public
domain), but at the same time denies access to persons who wish to use
the information for certain speech purposes,"' ° which would, in his
view, constitute an unconstitutional restriction upon speech.
Justice Stevens, who had delivered the majority opinion in United
States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press7' ten years earlier, dissented here. Joined by Justice Kennedy, he
agreed that California could constitutionally limit access to arrestee data
to those with a "special, and legitimate, need for the information," or
even close it off entirely. 2 But he found that the state's approach of
making the information available to scholars, news media, politicians,
and others, while denying access to requesters solely because they
intended to use the information for a constitutionally protected purpose,
was a form of unconstitutional discrimination."
Stevens' dissenting opinion underscores the most troubling aspect
of the United Reporting decision. The high court's ruling effectively
allows governmental entities to condition access to public information
based on a declaration that data would be used for "approved" purposes
only, even when other uses would be legal. As the Ninth Circuit found,
and as Justice Stevens argued in his dissent, such unlimited discretion
allows states to establish irrational standards that do nothing to promote
allegedly substantial interests. The high court failed to examine in detail
the underlying privacy concerns that had provided the rationale for the
legislation, or to balance those interests against the equally compelling
public interest in access, apparently leaving the states free to curtail
access to information that had long been public, presumably at will.
At the heart of the European Directive, the Hong Kong proposal,
and the myriad privacy laws and regulations that are cropping up
throughout the world, we find a concept profoundly at odds with a truly
69. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 490 (Scalia, J., concurring).
71. 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (holding that subjects retain a privacy interest in criminal
history records maintained in a centralized computer repository, even if the data is
derived from public sources).
72. United Reporting, 120 S. Ct. at 492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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free press: that the government is the best entity to protect people's
privacy. Modem European history provides countless illustrations of
why government restrictions on the dissemination of information in the
name of promoting press "responsibility" pose real and significant
threats to the common good. As Franz-Olivier Giesbert, referring to the
French privacy bill, wrote in Le Figaro, "Our government is in the
process of inventing a new concept: clean news, washed whiter than
white. What images of our terrible 20th century could be censored out
if we lost the right to look at the world in which we live?"'74
No one can deny that the traditional news media, as well as the new
Internet-based media whose unruly presence is only beginning to be
fully felt, can and do publish revelations that violate individuals'
privacy rights. Sometimes these revelations can be extremely hurtful to
the subject involved, and it may be appropriate to provide legal
remedies to grant them redress in meritorious cases where no public
interest is adversely affected. The difficulty lies in deciding where the
public interest stops and the private interest holds sway. It is wrong for
governments to make those determinations by adopting bright-line,
inflexible rules that can be misused to curtail legitimate inquiry and
revelation.
In the end, privacy is a subjective, and therefore, elusive, concept.
Its reflexive invocation creates unlimited opportunities for mischief and
for genuine damage to public welfare. Instead of embracing such
paternalistic concepts, we must have the courage to tolerate the potential
for some "excesses" in order to preserve higher values-preeminent
among them, the right of the people to be informed. The alternative is
to allow the government free rein, to "protect" the public from the press.
The only question is: Who, then, will protect the public from the
government?
74. Franz-Olivier Giesbert, Privacy and la Presse, reprinted in TIMES (London),
(October 6, 1999) <http://www.sun.../tim/999/10/06/timopnopeO2OO6.htmI>.
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